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Attorneys’ Fees in Environmental Citizen Suits and the 
Economically Benefited Plaintiff: 
When are Attorneys’ Fees and Costs Appropriate? 
  
MICHEL LEE* 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
Viewed as a cornerstone of the modern environmental movement, the 
Clean Air Act (CAA)1 embodied a new generation of environmental 
regulation.2  Coinciding with the first Earth Day and the establishment of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970, the CAA along with 
numerous groundbreaking statutes that followed, such as the Clean Water 
Act (CWA),3 gave the fledgling EPA unparalleled power and control.4  
Federal and state legislatures would later duplicate many of these 
innovations in a further attempt to improve environmental protection.5 
One of the most innovative mechanisms of environmental legislation 
resided in the CAA with its novel inclusion of a citizen suit provision, 
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 1. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006). 
 2. Daniel P. Selmi, Jurisdiction to Review Agency Inaction Under Federal 
Environmental Law, 72 IND. L.J. 65, 67 (1996). 
 3. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006). 
 4. EPA, THE GUARDIAN: ORIGINS OF THE EPA (EPA Historical Publication-1) (1992), 
http://www.epa.gov/history/publications/print/origins.htm. 
 5. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From The Beginning, a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A 
Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 1002 (1994) 
(the early 1970s “began the parade of regulatory statutes over the next several years the like 
of which we probably will never see again, virtually all driven by popular political fervor – 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (CAA), 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, the 
Noise Control Act of 1972, the Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA), the Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972, and more than two dozen more.”); David L. Markell, States as 
Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our “Laboratories Of Democracy” in the Effort to 
Improve Our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 354 (1994) 
(“states occupy an increasingly prominent role in environmental regulation and that 
considerable innovation has occurred at the state and local levels”). 
1
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which allowed citizens to file federal lawsuits to enforce the statute.6  
Almost every federal environmental statute that followed duplicated this 
“remarkable authority” to empower citizens.7  The concept of the citizen 
suit proved so powerful that other nations followed suit, allowing for 
similar citizen involvement.8  In a departure from the usual “American 
rule,” most of these citizen suit provisions included a section allowing for 
the recovery of attorneys’ fees, usually to the prevailing or substantially 
prevailing party.9  Predictably no aspect of these sections has created as 
much litigation as the issue of attorneys’ fees, “particularly as public 
interest law firms [attempt] to collect fees from a reluctant government.”10  
Cases that involve economic motivations have added to the debate.  
Whether a party should be entitled to compensation for its fees and costs in 
such a case currently remains unresolved and the subject of conflicting 
findings by several federal circuit courts. 
This comment will address the current federal circuit court split over 
the appropriate nature of attorneys’ fee and cost reimbursement where a 
plaintiff economically benefits from the outcome of a CAA lawsuit.  It will 
suggest solutions that balance environmental protection against abuse of the 
court system by parties with a self-interested economic motivation.  While 
the focus of the comment will center on fee reimbursement in CAA citizen 
suits, the analysis presented will demonstrate wide application beyond the 
CAA and the classically defined citizen suit.11 
The issue springs from a series of cases involving the interpretation of 
the attorney fee and cost provisions, also known as fee shifting, found in 
sections 304(d) and 307(f) of the CAA.12  These cases involve courts’ 
interpretations of what constitutes an “appropriate” condition for the award 
of litigation costs where an economic benefit accrues to the challenging 
party.  The Courts of Appeal for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have held in 
 
 6. James R. May, et. al., Environmental Citizens Suits at Thirtysomething: A 
Celebration and Summit, 33 ENVTL. L. REPR. 10,721, 10,721 (2003) (“Congress intended 
citizen suits to fill the vast void left by inadequate enforcement by federal and state 
regulators, and to ensure compliance and deter illegal activity. The approach stuck.”). 
 7. Id. (“Now more than one dozen federal environmental statutes, numerous state laws, 
and myriad foreign laws allow for such ‘environmental citizen suits.’”). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part I, 13 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,309, 10,312 (1983). 
 11. As will be discussed, attorney fee language is nearly ubiquitous among 
environmental citizen suit provisions, and exists in several other non-environmental statutes 
as well. 
 12. Clean Air Act §§ 304(d), 307(f), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f) (2006). 
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Florida Power & Light Co. v. Costle13 and Pound v. Airosol Co.,14 
respectively, that economic benefits borne from a CAA lawsuit do not 
generally have an impact on fees and costs.15  However, at a minimum, the 
parties must meet the standards promulgated by the Supreme Court in 
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,16 which require substantial success on the 
merits and result in an outcome that contributes to the goals of the act.17  
However, the Ninth Circuit in Western States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA18 
came to a different conclusion in 1996, determining that a fee and cost 
award was not appropriate when plaintiffs derive economic benefit from the 
suit.19 
Section two of this comment will briefly review citizen lawsuits and 
similar judicial review provisions.  Section three will discuss attorney fee 
awards, the “appropriateness” of the award, and the “reasonable” fee 
method by which awards are calculated.  Section four will examine the 
history and current status of the circuit court splits.  Section five will 
consider a series of solutions that might afford the best compromise 
between judicial efficiency and environmental protection.  Finally, sections 
six and seven will provide analysis and conclusion. 
 II.  CITIZEN LAWSUITS 
Towards the end of the 1960s, a growing public environmental 
awareness and an acknowledgment of a woefully inadequate environmental 
statutory regimen led to the 1970s’ revolution of environmental legislation, 
which also included the creation of citizen suits.20  The CAA would be one 
of the earliest examples of this emerging trend in environmental 
 
 13. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Costle (Florida II), 683 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). 
 14. Pound v. Airosol, Co. (Pound II), 498 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 15. See Florida II, 683 F.2d at 943 (finding “no basis for disqualifying a party from 
receiving an award merely because that party . . . has a financial interest in the outcome of 
the litigation”); Pound v. Airosol, Co., 498 F.3d at 1103 (concluding that a party bringing a 
CAA claim is not “disqualified from receiving attorney fees solely because it is an economic 
competitor of the alleged violator”). 
 16. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983). 
 17. Id. at 694 (“absent some degree of success on the merits by the claimant, it is not 
‘appropriate’ for a federal court to award attorneys’ fees under [CAA] § 307(f)”). 
 18. W. States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 19. Id. (“Congress neither intended to subsidize all litigation under the Clean Air Act nor 
contemplated that § 307(f) would benefit financially able parties who, out of their own 
substantial economic interests, would have litigated anyway”). 
 20. Miller, supra note 10, at 10,310; Plater, supra note 5, at 1001 (“By the end of the 
1960s, environmental consciousness had percolated sufficiently as a popular phenomenon 
and it flooded into the national political process . . .”). 
3
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lawmaking, which, as amended in 1970, created the first citizen suit 
provision.21  Concerned that EPA could not effectively manage the growing 
number of environmental mandates, Congress, for the first time, gave 
citizens the power to enforce the act as “private attorneys general,”22 
“borrowing a bit from common-law qui tam without the bounty.” 23 
In formulating the groundbreaking statute, Congress found itself 
initially split on the CAA’s “unprecedented”24 citizen suit provision.25  The 
House version lacked any such proviso and the Senate version provided 
sweeping citizen involvement by allowing citizens to enforce the act 
directly.26  However, with “considerable skepticism, if not despair, over the 
prospect of effective government enforcement,”27 Congress passed both the 
CAA and its accompanying citizen suit provision a few months after the 
first Earth Day.28  The final version of the citizen suit provision represented 
a compromise between the House and Senate authorizing “any person to 
commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . against any person” who 
violated an emission standard29 or “against the Administrator where there is 
alleged a failure . . . to perform any [non-discretionary] act or duty . . .”30 
This new practice of allowing citizens to participate in the 
environmental enforcement process spread to numerous federal, state, and 
 
 21. Miller, supra note 10, at 10,310; Plater, supra note 5, at 1002. 
 22. See James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 
30, 10 WID. L. SYMP. J. 1, 1 (2003); see also Robert Meltz, The Future of the Citizen Suit 
After Steel Co. and Laidlaw, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORTS RS20012, 1 
(1999), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/risk/rsk-38.cfm.; Zygmunt J.B. 
Plater, From The Beginning, a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A Theory and Short History 
of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 1006 (1994). 
 23. James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Environmental Citizen Suit Trends, 33 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 10,704, 10,704 (2003); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining qui tam 
action as “[a]n action brought under a statute that allows a private person to sue for a 
penalty, part of which the government or some specified public institution will receive”). 
 24. 116 CONG. REC. 32,925 (1970), reprinted in CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 9 at 294 (while not a hotly debated issue, citizen suits were subject to 
some vigorous discussion with Sen. Hruska derisively referring to the provision as 
“unprecedented in American history”). 
 25. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1783, at 55 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5374, 5388. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary 
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 846 
(1985). 
 28. Id. at 844. 
 29. Clean Air Act § 304(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1) (2006). 
 30. Id. § 304(a)(2). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/10
LEE 7/15/2009  12:06 AM 
2009] ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN ENVT’L CITIZEN SUITS 499 
foreign environmental statutes and laws.31  The similarities of these citizen 
suit provisions have been found by courts to be so derivative that they have 
tended to interpret them in the same manner, barring any obvious 
differences.32 
Prior to 1982, most of the citizen suits were used either to compel EPA 
action or to augment other proceedings in order to obtain further judicial 
review or damages.33  With the dawn of the Reagan administration in the 
early 1980s, the pro-environmental tide of the 1970s turned, and 
environmental enforcement dried to a trickle, refocusing citizen litigation 
from suits against the EPA to actions that directly targeted polluters.34  
Today, the citizen suit continues to provide a valuable service by 
encouraging and complementing environmental enforcement.  The need for 
this alternate enforcement mechanism remains essential, especially given 
the continuing decline of government enforcement actions brought on by 
increased economic and political pressures faced by state and federal 
agencies.35  The citizen suit remains one of the few tools the 
environmentalist has to counter the changing face of government policy.36  
 
 31. James R. May et. al., supra note 6, at 10,721 (2003); See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 
505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); Toxic Substances Control Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2006); 
Endangered Species Act § 11(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006); Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (2006); Solid Waste Disposal Act § 6972, 42 
U.S.C. § 6972 (2006); see also Richard A. Epstein, Standing in Law & Equity Defense of 
Citizen and Taxpayer Suits, 6 GREENBAG 17 (2002) (discussing an alternative view of the 
role and justification of citizen suits beyond environmental statutes). 
 32. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 559 
(1986) (where the court found the CAA and the Civil Rights Acts citizen suit provisions to 
be so similar “that they should be interpreted in a similar manner”); U.S. Dep’t. of Energy v. 
Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992) (finding that the CAA and RCRA citizen suit sections 
should be “treated together because their relevant provisions are similar”); Miller, supra note 
10, at 10,311 (“There are perhaps no sections of the environmental statutes where precedent 
under one statute [relating to citizen suit sections] so clearly applies to others.”). 
 33. Boyer, supra note 27, at 852. 
 34. Ann Powers, Gwaltney of Smithfield Revisited, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 557, 562 (1999). 
 35. David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal 
System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by The United 
States, The States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1619 (1995); Kristi M. Smith, 
Who’s Suing Whom?: A Comparison Of Government and Citizen Suit Environmental 
Enforcement Actions Brought Under EPA-Administered Statutes, 1995-2000, 29 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 359, 396 n.152 (citing May, supra note 31, at 10,718) (“finding that in the last 
five years [1995-2000] EPA referrals for government civil enforcement of the CWA ‘fell by 
a whopping 55%’ while citizen notice of intent to sue rose”). 
 36. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 8 (Oxford University Press 1992) (showing declining enforcement 
of the CWA under the Regan administration). 
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As envisioned by Congress over thirty years ago, the citizen suit balances 
cumbersome, often industry biased government interests against the desire 
to protect the environment at any cost.37  Congress continues to recognize 
the value of the provision, commenting during the 1985 amendments to the 
CWA, that “[c]itizen suits are a proven enforcement tool [and that] they 
operate as Congress intended – to both spur and supplement [ ] government 
enforcement actions [and] have deterred violators and achieved significant 
compliance gains.”38  The threat of citizen intervention continues to 
challenge those insiders who prefer to regulate without outside interference 
from an increasingly interested electorate.39 
Best known as the judicial review portion of the CAA, section 30740 
provides the framework for challenges to EPA decision making on a 
number of levels, including air quality standards, emission standards, and 
most agency determinations, regulations, controls, or prohibitions.41  While 
the section has primarily been the mechanism for the regulated community 
to challenge EPA, citizens have regularly used it to contest EPA 
promulgated standards, effectively making it the “little brother” of section 
304.42  However, while all citizen suit provisions contain attorney fee 
language, few judicial review sections, with the exception of the CAA and 
 
 37. Mark Seidenfeld & Janna Satz Nugent, “The Friendship of the People:” Citizen 
Participation in Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 269, 269-72 (2005); 
see also David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law: Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, Emissions Trading, and Priority-Setting, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 501, 515-16 
(2004) (best describing the free-market pull towards environmentally unfriendly policies: 
“People who make profits from environmentally-degrading activities acquire the means to 
hire lawyers and lobbyists to limit government efforts to protect the environment. And all of 
us have an incentive to favor reduced taxation, which limits the administrative capacity of 
government. Over time, these efforts have a rather profound effect.”). 
 38. S. REP. NO. 99-50, at 28 (1985); Kerry D. Florio, Comment, Attorneys’ Fees in 
Environmental Citizen Suits: Should Prevailing Defendants Recover?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 707, 712-13 (2000). 
 39. See Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy Under Bush 
II, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 363, 387 (2004) (describing the case of EPA Secretary 
Gale Norton’s ultimately unsuccessful attempt to restrict Endangered Species Act (ESA) 
citizen suits through an appropriation rider during the in the early part of the second Bush 
administration). 
 40. Clean Air Act § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (2006). 
 41. Id. § 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). 
 42. See Amy Semmel, Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club: A Misinterpretation of the Clean Air 
Act’s Attorneys’ Fees Provision, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 399, 400 (1985); Selmi, supra note 2, at 
73. 
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Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),43 allow the recovery of attorneys’ 
fees and costs.44 
 III.  ATTORNEYS’ FEES 
Unlike English courts, which authorized the award of counsel fees to 
successful litigants as early as 1278, United States courts have taken an 
opposite approach.45  Under the so-called “American rule,” each party in 
civil litigation has the absolute responsibility to pay its own attorneys’ fees 
no matter the outcome of the trial.46  There are several exceptions to the 
rule, the primary one being congressional legislation making “specific and 
explicit provisions for the allowance of attorneys’ fees.”47  This exception 
applies to public litigants as much as private ones in that “only exceptions 
[to the American rule] ‘specifically provided by statute’ will subject the 
United States or its agencies to liability for attorneys’ fees.”48  The First 
Circuit Court of Appeals in NRDC, Inc. v. EPA explained, “[w]hen private 
litigation vindicates a significant public policy and, at the same time, 
creates a widespread benefit, policy today favors awarding attorneys’ fees 
against a party who exists to serve or represent the interests of all those 
benefited [sic].”49  The list of statutory exceptions to the American rule is 
extensive and ranges from antitrust to patent laws.50 
Within the CAA’s section 304 citizen suit statute lies a fee shifting 
provision that allows “[t]he court . . . [to] award costs of litigation 
(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, 
whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.”51  This same fee 
 
 43. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (2006); Toxic Substances 
Control Act § 19(d); 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d) (2006) (specific fees and costs provision in the 
TSCA judicial review section). 
 44. Jeffery G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws Part III, 
14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,407, 10,409 (1984) (“Attorney fee awards are authorized by all of the 
citizen suit provisions, but under few of the judicial review provisions. As a consequence, it 
has not been unusual for persons challenging administrative action to attempt to recoup their 
attorneys fees under the citizen suit sections, [usually unsuccessfully].”). 
 45. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 n.18 (1975). 
 46. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical 
Overview, 31 DUKE L.J. 651, 651 (1982); see also Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 
849, 873-79 (1929) (coining the term “American Rule”). 
 47. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260. 
 48. Rhode Island Comm. on Energy v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 561 F.2d 397, 405 (1st Cir. 
1977). 
 49. NRDC, Inc. v. EPA, 484 F.2d 1331, 1332 (1st Cir. 1973). 
 50. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 260-61, 260 n.33. 
 51. Clean Air Act § 304(d); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2006). 
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shifting language, added in the act’s 1977 amendment, is found in the 
judicial review portion of the statute at section 307, allowing a court to 
“award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness 
fees) whenever it determines that such award is appropriate.”52  This 
similarity of language has led courts to consider the section 304 and section 
307 fee shifting provisions interchangeably, finding that “whatever general 
standard may apply under section 307(f), a similar standard applies under 
section 304(d).”53  Furthermore, similar to the general treatment of cross-
statute citizen suit provisions,54 this kind of fee shifting language is viewed 
as being so similar across diverse statutes that the Court tends to treat all 
similar provisions as pari passu,55 or as equals.56 
Expressing a desire that fee shifting promotes citizen participation, 
Congress recognized that “in bringing legitimate actions . . .  citizens would 
be performing a public service and in such instances, the courts should 
award costs of litigation to such party.”57  In 1977, when adding the 
language to section 307, Congress indicated the desire to use fee shifting to 
“encourage litigation which will assure proper implementation and 
administration of the act or otherwise serve the public interest.”58  How 
much of a role the attorneys’ fee provision in fact plays in driving lawsuits 
is a matter of some debate.  Attorneys have argued that these provisions are 
not enough to encourage people to sue, while industry, perhaps predictably, 
disagrees.59 
 
 52. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 305, 91 Stat. 685, 777 
(1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 7607(f)); Clean Air Act § 307(f), 42 U.S.C. § 
7607(f) (2006). 
 53. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 691 (1983); See also Pound v. Airosol, 
Co. (Pound II), 498 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 2007) (case arising under § 304 of the CAA, where 
the court extensively refers to and relies on the legislative history and circuit court decisions 
involving § 307 of the CAA). 
 54. See supra note 32. 
 55. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining pari passu as “[p]roportionally; 
at an equal pace; without preference”). 
 56. Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (“The similarity of [the fee-
shifting] language in [the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972] § 718 and [the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964] § 204 (b) is, of course, a strong indication that the two statutes should be 
interpreted pari passu.”). 
 57. S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3747. 
 58. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 337 (Comm. Rep.) (1977) (commenting on the addition of 
the fee-shifting provision in § 307, 42 U.S.C. 7607(f)). 
 59. Bruce J. Terris, Private Watchdogs: Internal Auditing and External Enforcement – 
Three Perspectives – Environmentalists’ Citizen Suits, in THE PRIVATE ASSUMPTION OF 
PREVIOUSLY PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES: THE EXPANDING ROLE OF PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS IN 
PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING 16 (May 16–17, 1986). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/10
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In addition, to prevent the promotion of unnecessary “harassing suits,” 
the language of the provision does not differentiate between plaintiff and 
defendant.  This allows defendants who are victims of unwarranted lawsuits 
the right to receive fair compensation for unwarranted actions, shifting the 
burden to the plaintiff.60  However, this option requires a party to act 
egregiously as courts require a plaintiff to be acting with clearly frivolous 
or unjustified motivations in order to recover attorney fees.61  This judicial 
restraint on defensive fee shifting provides a logical limit to the fee shifting 
provision, promoting the act as desired and furthering pro-environmental 
policies by diminishing the chilling effect a broad “plaintiff pays” option 
would have on a citizen litigant.62  Without such restrictions on the attorney 
fee provisions environmental groups might think twice if they were to face 
the burden of paying attorney fees.63  Much of the court’s struggle with 
when to apply fee shifting stems from the statute’s unclear language, which 
lacks a precise standard to determine when such fees are “appropriate.”64 
 
 60. 116 CONG. REC. 32,927 (1970) (“The Senator from Nebraska raised the question of 
possible harassing suits by citizens. This the committee attempted to discourage by 
providing that the costs of litigation – including counsel fees – may be awarded by the courts 
to the defendants in such cases, so that the citizen who brings a harassing suit is subject not 
only to the loss of his own costs of litigation, but to the burden of bearing the costs of the 
parties against whom he has brought the suit in the first instance.”). 
 61. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Realty Investments Assocs., 524 F. Supp. 
150, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that “Congress’s design of encouraging citizen suits would 
be substantially frustrated were Section 7604(d) read to permit prevailing defendants to 
recover attorneys’ fees with the same relative ease that successful plaintiffs enjoy . . . 
prevailing defendants may recover fees under Section 7604(d) only where the action may be 
fairly characterized as frivolous or harassing”). 
 62. Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chemical Co., 885 F. Supp. 934, 939 (E.D. Tex. 
1995) (“To place upon these citizen plaintiffs the speculative hazard of paying a Defendant’s 
attorneys’ fees and costs would likely have an undesirable effect. Such a hazard would have 
a chilling effect upon citizens bringing enforcement action under Section 1365 [of the 
CWA].”); Florio, supra note 38, at 733 (“In order to ensure the effectiveness of citizen suit 
provisions, Congress provided fee-shifting provisions in environmental legislation to 
encourage citizens to engage in socially beneficial litigation. Common sense suggests that 
increasing defendants' ability to recover attorneys’ fees would significantly decrease the 
ability of citizens to bring suit.”). 
 63. See Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 182 F.3d 1091, 1093-96 (9th Cir. 1991) (the 
frivolous standard for denial of attorneys’ fees was not universally applied until recently, as 
explained in this case concerning the use of fee shifting in the Endangered Species Act – the 
case also illustrates the cross application of fee shifting principles among different statutes). 
 64. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683 (1983) (“it is difficult to draw any 
meaningful guidance from § 307(f)’s use of the word ‘appropriate’”). 
9
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A.  Appropriate Standard 
The fee shifting provisions allow the award of costs and fees when 
“appropriate.”65  Not surprisingly, the vague language of the section has 
been subject to much debate, leading courts and commentators to struggle 
with questions such as whether a party must be victorious, pro-
environment, or even financially solvent.  The language in sections 304(d) 
and 307(f) is vague on the issue of whether a plaintiff must win in order to 
recover costs and fees.  Other statutes’ citizen suit provisions, such as those 
found in the CWA, are slightly more explicit on this point, allowing 
recovery of fees to a “prevailing or substantially prevailing party.”66  The 
CAA leaves this issue up to the court, which must decide what is 
“appropriate.”67 
The courts grappled with the meaning of “appropriate” and initially 
found in cases such as Sierra Club v. Gorsuch,68 that whether plaintiffs 
were “entitled to attorneys’ fees turned not on whether they had prevailed in 
whole or in part, but on whether they had served the goals of the Clean Air 
Act.”69  In fact, most federal lower courts found the “appropriate” standard 
to be broad enough to include unsuccessful litigants, who, at a minimum, 
contributed to the goals of the act.70  However, in 1983, the seminal case of 
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club71 rebuffed this broad interpretation.  By relying 
on the statute’s legislative history as well as other similar fee shifting 
statutes, such as the CWA,72 the Court found that fee shifting applied only 
where a plaintiff was at least somewhat successful on the merits and 
contributed to the goals of the act.73  The Court explained that an overbroad 
 
 65. Clean Air Act § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2006). 
 66. Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2006). 
 67. Clean Air Act §§ 304(d), 307(f), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f) (2006). 
 68. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 69. Id. at 38. 
 70. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 672 F.2d 42, 48 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“In enacting a 
provision allowing for an award of attorneys' fees whenever a court finds that such ‘an award 
is appropriate,’ it seems plain that Congress intended to give the courts greater latitude than 
is allowed under statutes such as FOIA (‘substantially prevailing’) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 
(‘prevailing party’).”); Walter B. Russell, III and Paul Thomas Gregory, Note, Awards of 
Attorney’s Fees in Environmental Litigation: Citizen Suits and the “Appropriate” Standard, 
18 GA. L. REV. 307, 322-23 (1984). 
 71. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. 680. 
 72. Clean Air Act § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2006). 
 73. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682; But cf. Metro. Wash. Coal. for Clean Air v. District of 
Columbia, 639 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (exceptional case where court allowed attorneys’ 
fees where citizen suit was dismissed, appears contrary to Ruckelshaus); For a more detailed 
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interpretation of the “appropriate” standard would not only contradict the 
legislative history74 but would also be implicitly unfair to prevailing 
defendants by compelling them to pay a plaintiff who had erroneously 
accused them of violating the law.75  The majority found that Congress 
intended only to eliminate both the restrictive readings of “prevailing party” 
found in other statutes and the necessity for “case-by-case scrutiny” by 
federal courts that had been used previously, requiring the courts to delve 
into whether plaintiffs prevailed “essentially” on “central issues.”76  This 
led to the currently accepted standard of “partially prevailing parties – 
parties achieving some success, even if not major success.”77  The degree of 
success may not be trivial or “purely procedural” and a court must examine 
each issue and determine the level of success in order to determine the 
appropriate award.78  While the ruling appeared to restrict the cases where a 
party might recover fees, it did not limit the pool of litigants eligible for 
relief, which could include interveners79 and those who demonstrated some 
level of success through a consent decree.80  In fact, under the so-called 
catalyst theory, adjudication of a case is not a prerequisite to fee shifting as 
long as the settlement leads to “substantial relief prior to adjudication on the 
merits.”81  The concept of recoverable fees can also extend to the cost of 
press conferences, lobbying, and public relations work related to the 
action.82 
 
discussion concerning Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air and its relationship 
to Ruckelshaus see Russell & Gregory, supra note 70, at 333. 
 74. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 686-92. 
 75. Id. at 692. But see supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text (it is unclear whether 
the Court was either unaware of the lower courts movement away from the strict “plaintiff 
pays” approach or whether they wished to make a clear statement eschewing such practices). 
 76. Id. at 688. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at note.9. 
 79. U.S. v. City of San Diego, 18 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1098 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (“The Court 
agrees that Sierra Club [as an intervener] is a ‘prevailing party’ because it succeeded on 
significant issues and achieved the primary objective of its intervention.”). 
 80. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) (“The fact that respondent prevailed 
through a settlement rather than through litigation does not weaken her claim to fees”); Ellen 
P. Chapnick, Access to the Courts, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND 
PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONAL RISKS 372 (Michael B. Gerrard ed. 1999). 
 81. Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718, 719 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Kelly L. Jones, Comment, 
Sierra Club v. EPA: Is changing the American Rule for Attorneys’ Fees Un-American? The 
Debate on Congressional Fee-Shifting Statutes, 18 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 245, 
245 (2004). 
 82. U.S. v. City of San Diego, 18 F. Supp. 2d at 1099 (“[P]revailing civil rights counsel 
are entitled to compensation for the same tasks as a private attorney. Where the giving of 
press conferences and performance of other lobbying and public relations work is directly 
11
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While Ruckelshaus dealt specifically with section 307(f), the Court 
made it clear “that section 307(f) was meant to parallel section 304(d) of the 
Clean Air Act . . . .”83  In fact, the view of “appropriate” under Ruckelshaus 
extends well beyond the CAA to at least sixteen separate federal statutes 
with similar language.84 
In 1982, the D.C. Circuit Court addressed the issue of whether a 
plaintiff must take a pro-environmental position in order to qualify for 
attorneys’ fees, using a rationale that eerily paralleled the later trio of cases 
discussed in this comment.85  In Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch,86 the 
District of Columbia along with environmental groups, sued and prevailed 
against the EPA using the CAA citizen suit provision under section 307(f).  
The EPA argued that the District did not deserve attorneys’ fees because it 
“litigated in furtherance of its economic interests and therefore did not need 
the prospect of an attorneys’ fee recovery as an inducement to advocate in 
the public interest.”87  The court soundly rejected the argument finding 
“[t]he suggestion that fee awards are limited to parties asserting ‘pro-
environment’ claims has no support in the words of the statute or its 
legislative history . . ..”88  The court focused on the issue of a party’s 
environmental motivation, rather than its economic interests and declined to 
rule on the narrower question, later addressed by the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits, of whether fee awards could apply where a nongovernmental party 
acted only to forward its own economic self-interest, regardless of its 
environmental position.89 
 
and intimately related to the successful representation of a client, private attorneys do such 
work and bill their clients. Prevailing civil rights plaintiffs may do the same.” (quoting Davis 
v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1545 (9th Cir. 1992)); Chapnick, supra 
note 80, at 372. 
 83. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 35 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 84. Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League v. Marsh, 786 F.2d 631, 634 n.6 (5th Cir. 1986) (“the 
term ‘appropriate’ controls the construction of the same term in § 505(d) of the Clean Water 
Act and in a number of other federal statutes” (citing Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682)). 
 85. Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (note that this case 
predates Florida Power & Light Co. v. Costle, the earliest of the subject cases discussed, by 
a mere six months and would later be cited in W. States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA in 1996). 
 86. Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1. 
 87. Id. at 5. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. (“Without passing on the eligibility under Section 307(f) of a financially able 
nongovernmental party having no more than its own economic interests at heart, we perceive 
no reason for refusing a fee allowance here.”). 
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Another factor considered when looking at attorneys’ fees has been 
plaintiff solvency.90  Here the question is whether a for-profit, financially 
solvent corporation is eligible for reimbursement of its fees and costs.  As 
with the pro-environmental question, this issue finds close linkage to the 
subject of a party’s economic interest and benefit.  Courts have generally 
ignored this issue without considering a party’s interest.  However, the 
court in Alabama Power did signal some sympathy for the argument that 
the Act was not intended to subsidize “corporations or trade associations, 
that could otherwise afford to participate.”91  This interpretation will play a 
greater role when evaluating the suggested solutions to the circuit split and 
the need to calculate economic benefit.92 
B.  Calculating a Reasonable Fee 
Assuming entitlement to a fee, the question arises as to what a court 
considers to be a “reasonable” fee.93  The first attempt to develop a formula 
led to the creation of a complex and vague twelve-factor test originating out 
of the Fifth Circuit in 1974.94  The Third Circuit used a simplified test that 
established the starting point of the “reasonable” fee “by multiplying the 
hourly rate for each attorney times the number of hours he worked on the 
case.”95  The court adjusted this initial “lodestar” amount based on the 
“riskiness” and quality of the attorney’s work.96  This multiplier scheme 
continued to create more problems than it solved and over time and several 
cases, the United States Supreme Court began to simplify the formula.97  
 
 90. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Costle (Florida II), 683 F.2d 941, 942 (5th Cir. Unit B 
1982); Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 7. 
 91. Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 7 n.33 (quoting 112 CONG. REC. 32,855 
(1976) (remarks of Senator Magnuson)). 
 92. See infra Part V. 
 93. Generally speaking, all components of the cost of litigation must be reasonable. See 
Perreira v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (1992). 
 94. Johnson v. Geor. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-20 (5th Cir. 1974) (the 
twelve factors being: time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions, the 
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, the preclusion of other employment, the 
customary fee, whether the fee is fixed or contingent, time limitations imposed by the client 
or the circumstances, the amount involved and results obtained, the experience, reputation, 
and ability of the attorneys, the “undesirability” of the case, the nature and length of the 
professional relationship with the client, and awards in similar cases). 
 95. Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 
167 (3d Cir. 1973). 
 96. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564 
(1986). 
 97. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 
(1984). 
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By 1986, the Supreme Court devised a method that eliminated complicated 
multipliers and established a simple “reasonable hours times a reasonable 
rate” calculus which could be modified “only in certain ‘rare’ and 
‘exceptional’ cases, supported by both ‘specific evidence’ on the record and 
detailed findings by the lower courts.”98  Furthermore, where a party has 
only partial success, the court must weigh that success and award fees that 
are commensurate to the result.99 
As courts have struggled with the “appropriate” element of fee shifting 
in the CAA, they have made decisive steps towards a unified approach to 
the issue of when and to whom fees might be awarded.  Furthermore, they 
have come to basic agreement of what consists of a “reasonable” fee.  
However, the remaining issue of economic benefit that eluded the court in 
Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch has yet to reach the consensus that has 
graced the other components of what constitutes an “appropriate” and 
“reasonable” attorneys’ fee.100 
 IV.  CIRCUIT CASE SPLITS 
The first direct attempt to address the issue of a plaintiff’s economic 
benefit and the award of attorneys’ fees occurred in 1982 involving a case 
that followed Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch by a mere six months.101 The 
Fifth Circuit in Florida Power & Light v. Costle found that a plaintiff’s 
economic benefit had no effect on the award of fees and costs, maintaining 
the status quo.102  Then, in 1996, the Ninth Circuit, in Western States 
Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA, explicitly disagreed with the Fifth Circuit and 
suggested, for the first time, that economic benefit should factor in the 
“appropriateness” analysis.103  With a circuit split firmly established, it 
would not be until 2006, that the Tenth Circuit joined the debate in Pound 
v. Airosol Co. and sided with the Fifth Circuit, finding that financial interest 
did not preclude the award of attorneys’ fees.104  Below follows a further 
examination of the courts’ rationales, illuminating the source of the split 
and offering solutions to clarify the meaning of “appropriate” and 
“reasonable” in the context of an economically benefited plaintiff. 
 
 98. Pennsylvania, 478 U.S. at 565. 
 99. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 424. 
 100. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 101. See supra note 85. 
 102. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Costle (Florida II), 683 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). 
 103. W. States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 104. Pound v. Airosol, Co. (Pound II), 498 F.3d 1089 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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A.  Florida Power – Fifth Circuit 
In 1982, in the Fifth Circuit, Florida Power & Light Company (FP&L) 
moved to obtain attorneys’ fees and costs after successfully challenging 
EPA’s attempt to force Florida to incorporate its state-imposed two-year 
limitation on relief into a federally enforceable state implementation 
plan.105  Florida Power & Light v. Costle had more to do with EPA’s abuse 
of discretion than protection of the environment, as there was little 
environmental benefit from the decision.106  In fact, the original ruling 
allowed FP&L to increase emissions at its power plant in response to a 
reduced supply of low sulfur fuel oil, without which FP&L and a number of 
other similarly situated power plants would have incurred enormous 
expense.107 
In arguing against the application of fee shifting, the EPA claimed that 
Congress never intended an award of fees and costs to a “large, solvent 
corporation whose main motivation . . . is financial interest.”108  The agency 
further asserted that FP&L did not require the financial motivation of 
section 307(f) fee shifting to initiate such a suit and “that the result achieved 
by FP&L . . . conferred only a ‘company-specific’ benefit and that any 
public benefit was incidental.”109  However, the court, looking to legislative 
history, found that the fee shifting provision intended not only to protect the 
environment, but also to “encourage litigation which [would] assure proper 
implementation and administration of the act or otherwise serve the public 
interest.”110 Here, the court appeared to split the “appropriate” test into two 
possibilities by creating both an implementation and public interest prong. 
While the court sympathized with EPA’s argument on policy grounds, 
they found no evidence in either the statute or legislative history that fee 
shifting awards were to be based on either the solvency or economic 
interests of the plaintiff.111  Here, they expressly found that FP&L 
financially benefited from a result that actually led to greater emissions and 
 
 105. Florida II, 683 F.2d at 942; Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Costle (Florida I), 650 F.2d 
579 (5th Cir. Unit B June 1981) (originating case determining that EPA had abused its 
discretion). 
 106. Florida II, 683 F.2d at 942-43. 
 107. Florida I, 650 F.2d at 581-82. 
 108. Id. at 942. 
 109. Id. at 943. 
 110. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 337 (1977) (emphasis added); see also Ruckelshaus v. 
Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983). 
 111. Florida II, 683 F.2d at 943. 
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thus increased pollution, arguably worsening the environment.112  However, 
curbing EPA’s error in judgment was of enough value in that it met the goal 
of “assuring ‘proper implementation and administration of the Act.’”113 
B.  Western States – Ninth Circuit 
In 1996 a group of trade associations and air pollutant dischargers sued 
the EPA under the judicial review provision of the CAA and eventually 
prevailed, with the court finding that the EPA had abused its discretion by 
unexplainably treating the petitioners differently than similarly situated 
groups.114  Similar to Florida Power & Light Co. the resulting outcome of 
Western States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA did not improve the environment; 
rather, it exempted certain “insignificant emissions” from the CAA 
permitting scheme.115  While EPA had approved such exemptions in eight 
other state and local programs, they disapproved of Washington State’s 
plan, flatly denying “the obvious inconsistency between its rejection of the 
Washington program and its approval of other state programs.”116  The 
court found EPA had abused its discretion and ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs.  However, the court took a different approach in deciding upon 
their request for attorneys’ fees.117 
The court expressly “decline[d] to adopt the approach of the Fifth 
Circuit” 118 and instead turned to the District of Columbia Circuit’s 
Alabama Power Co. v. Gorsuch.119  There, the court looked to the 
“legislative history of [section] 19(d) of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 2618(d), which use[d] the same ‘appropriate’ standard as the 
Clean Air Act, reveal[ing] the clearest expression of congressional purpose 
in enacting statues of this type.”120  From that prior decision, the court 
delved into the legislative history and discovered very specific references to 
an economically benefited plaintiff. 
The court quoted Senator Magnuson, who during debate on the final 
version of section 19(d) stated, in part: 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. W. States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 282-85 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 115. Id. at 282. 
 116. Id. at 285. 
 117. Id.; Brief of Petitioner, No. 95-70034, 1995 WL 17013960, at *23 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 118. W. States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA, 87 F.3d at 286. 
 119. Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 120. W. States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA, 87 F.3d at 286 (quoting Ala. Power Co., 672 
F.2d at 7 n.33). 
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It is not the intention of these provisions to provide an award for an 
individual or a group if that individual or group may stand to gain 
significant economic benefits through participation in the 
proceeding . . . It is not intended that the provisions support 
participation of persons, including corporations or trade associations, 
that could otherwise afford to participate . . . Whether or not the 
person’s resources are sufficient to enable participation would 
include consideration of . . . the likelihood that the person would 
seek to participate in the proceeding whether or not compensation 
was available.121 
Based on these findings, the court found no indication that Congress 
intended the CAA fee shifting provisions to subsidize all litigation or 
benefit economically advantaged parties who would have litigated 
anyway.122  Finding that the plaintiffs would have sued regardless of a fee 
award and that the narrow scope of the action, which concerned a single 
anomalous decision, had not “served the public interest in assisting in the 
interpretation and implementation of the Clean Air Act,” the court refused 
to award attorneys’ fees.123  Interestingly, the court reached this conclusion 
independently, without prodding from any of the parties.124 
C.  Pound – Tenth Circuit 
In 2006, under the citizen suit provision of the CAA, a company 
named Pro Products successfully mounted a suit against one of its 
competitors in the case of Pound v. Airosol Co.125  Pro Products alleged 
that Airosol marketed and sold a pesticide called Black Knight for use in 
eliminating reptile parasites, which contained ozone depleting 
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) in violation of section 610(d)(1)(A) of 
the CAA.126  When calculating monetary penalties for the violation, the 
 
 121. Id. (quoting 112 CONG. REC. 32,855 (1976) (remarks of Senator Magnuson)) 
(emphasis added). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (the court also notes that the petitioners had not contributed substantially to the 
goals of the CAA as a further reason for denying the fee award without explaining how this 
might be differentiated from not “serv[ing] the public interest in assisting in the 
interpretation and implementation of the Clean Air Act”). 
 124. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 117 (the only reference to attorneys’ fees is found 
on page 23 of the petitioner brief, neither the respondents nor petitioner ever mention 
attorneys’ fees or 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) subsequently). 
 125. Pound II, 498 F.3d 1089. 
 126. Pound v. Airosol Co. (Pound I), 440 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1243 (D. Kan. 2006); Clean 
Air Act § 610(d)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7671i(d)(1)(A) (stating that it “shall be unlawful for any 
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United States District Court for the District of Kansas found that Pro 
Products “brought the instant lawsuit for the purpose of removing one of 
their competitors from the market.”127  They did not believe that Pro 
Products initiated the suit to benefit the environment; rather, they deemed 
the interest as primarily economic and not environmental.128  Upon a 
request for plaintiff attorneys’ fees, the court, in a prior order, specifically 
discussed the Fifth and Ninth Circuit splits “regarding whether an award of 
attorney fees is appropriate when the prevailing party brought the suit for 
personal financial gain rather than to further the purpose of the Clean Air 
Act.” 129  Finding the Tenth Circuit silent on the issue, the court denied the 
plaintiff’s request for fees and costs. 130 
Pro Products appealed, challenging the lower court’s lack of monetary 
penalty and refusal to award attorney fees.131  While concluding that the 
district court’s penalty analysis was erroneous, the Tenth Circuit took the 
opportunity to resolve the lingering question concerning fees in such 
economic circumstances.132  Although the lower court failed to issue a 
penalty, the circuit court found that Airosol’s actions clearly violated the 
CAA, establishing that Pro Products had achieved some degree of success 
on the merits.133  When grappling with the issue of whether the action 
served the public and the CAA, the court acknowledged the Ninth Circuit’s 
ruling in Western States, which suggested that “it may not be appropriate to 
award a party attorney fees under the CAA when that party brought suit 
only to serve its own economic interests.”134 
However, the court found that the suit successfully minimized air 
pollution by promoting enforcement of section 610(d)(1)(A), thereby 
assisting in the implementation of the statute.135  After establishing that Pro 
 
person to sell or distribute, or offer for sale or distribution, in interstate commerce – any 
aerosol product or other pressurized dispenser which contains a class II substance”); Clean 
Air Act § 602(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7671a(b) (listing the hydrochlorofluorocarbons that are 
considered class II substances). 
 127. Pound I, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 1247. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (discussing a prior March 4, 2005 order denying attorney’s fees). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Pound II, 498 F.3d 1093. 
 132. Id. at 1094, 1100-03. 
 133. Id. at 1102-03. 
 134. Id. at 1102. 
 135. Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“party must have served the 
public interest by assisting in the proper implementation of the statute”); Florida II, 683 F.2d 
at 942 (“encourage litigation which will assure proper implementation and administration of 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss2/10
LEE 7/15/2009  12:06 AM 
2009] ATTORNEYS’ FEES IN ENVT’L CITIZEN SUITS 513 
Products achieved the minimum requirements for the award of fees, the 
court turned to the impact of economic interest.  Quoting directly from the 
Florida Power & Light Co. decision, the court paralleled the Fifth Circuit, 
stating that there was no foundation to disqualify a party from receiving 
attorney fees “merely because that party is solvent and has a financial 
interest in the outcome of the litigation.”136 
With the circuits split on the role economic benefit plays in the award 
of attorneys’ fees, the question turns to congressional intent and public 
policy.  Did Congress intend to “subsidize all litigation,”137 regardless of 
the economic benefit, or did it expect fee shifting to be an alternative for 
those plaintiffs who did not personally stand to gain from the outcome of a 
suit?138  From a public policy perspective, there are serious questions as to 
the wisdom of ignoring economic benefit while factoring the 
appropriateness of a fee and cost award.  Unnecessary financial incentives 
in the form of fee shifting are likely both inefficient and environmentally 
unfriendly as will be discussed below.139 
 V.  SOLUTIONS 
The issue of financial solvency alone does not seem to be the focus of 
the dispute.  While the “financially solvent” party might have the “deep 
pockets” to pay its own attorneys’ fees, the issue of economic self-interest 
is the most likely cause of discomfort and is inextricable from the financial 
solvency question.140  The strong financial solvency of most large non-
profit environmental organizations, who are rarely scrutinized when it 
comes to fee shifting, are prime examples of why solvency is not the sole 
issue.  Some non-profits earn as much as large corporations.  For example, 
the Sierra Club and its Foundation jointly grossed over one hundred and ten 
million dollars in 2006,141 the National Resources Defense Council earned 
 
the Act or otherwise serve the public interest” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 337 
(1977)). 
 136. Pound II, 498 F.3d 1089, 1102 (quoting Florida II, 683 F.2d at 943). 
 137. W. States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA, 87 F.3d at 286. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See infra Part V. 
 140. See Florida II, 683 F.2d 941; Pound II, 498 F.3d 1089; W. States Petroleum Ass’n v. 
EPA, 87 F.3d 280; Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 1 (most cases asking the solvency 
question associate the inquiry to the issue of financial motivation, even when discussing a 
plaintiff’s environmental or financial position). 
 141. SIERRA CLUB, IRS FORM 990 – RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME 
TAX (2006), http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2006/941/153/2006-94115330703c1f3 
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over seventy million dollars in 2005,142 and the Defenders of Wildlife made 
almost thirty million dollars in 2005.143  Furthermore, large organizations, 
who would be the most likely to be financially solvent, have been found to 
“no longer dominate the citizen suit arena.”144 
The circuits appear split for good reasons, as courts recognize that fee 
shifting provisions were never designed to promote financial reward for 
parties who were either filing a citizen suit or challenging an EPA action for 
their own private interests.145  With vested interests, parties would likely 
initiate a suit without added incentives.146  By offering fee shifting to the 
economically advantaged, a disproportionate gain would accrue, since a 
party would obtain the benefit with no legal costs.147  On an economic 
level, this double gain would arguably lead to an inefficient allocation of 
resources, since the economically advantaged plaintiff would be getting his 
benefit at another’s expense.148  Even if a lack of reimbursement were a 
disincentive to sue, a large potential economic benefit would likely 
overcome such a hurdle.  Parties can make the same kinds of calculations 
concerning potential success and economic benefit as they would in any 
civil suit.  Even the Tenth Circuit in Pound, while disagreeing with the 
Ninth Circuit’s broad restriction of fee awards to an economically benefited 
 
b4-9O.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2009); THE SIERRA CLUB FOUNDATION, IRS FORM 990 – 
RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX (2006), http://www.guidestar.org/ 
FinDocuments/2006/946/069/2006-946069890-03720918-9.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
 142. NATIONAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., IRS FORM 990 – RETURN OF 
ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX (2005), http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments 
/2006/132/654/2006-132654926-03a9b0c7-9.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
 143. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, IRS FORM 990 – RETURN OF ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM 
INCOME TAX (2004), http://www.guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2006/530/183/200653018 
3181-03a6359c-9.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2009). 
 144. Smith, supra note 35, at 362. 
 145. See W. States Petroleum Ass’n, 87 F.3d at 286. 
 146. Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 27, at 839-40 (arguing that besides attorney fees a 
citizen litigator’s incentives might include settling so as to obtain “an ‘environmental fund’ 
dedicated to particular conservation uses . . . [and] . . . bring suits for the purpose of 
attracting or retaining members”). 
 147. See infra note 151 (a strong argument exists that this benefit is no windfall, as courts 
have tended to limit fees when calculating the reasonable lodestar amount). 
 148. See Joseph E. Hoffer, Comment, Qui Tam: Survival of the Action and Fate of the 
Proceeds Following the Death of the Relator. For the King And For Himself . . . and His 
Heirs, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 199, 208 (2005) (arguing that failing to allow qui tam actions to 
continue under the False Claims Act would lead to inefficient allocation of resources); 
Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and The Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory 
Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 815 (2006) (explaining the inefficient allocation of 
resources where a borrower pays more than is necessary for a home loan because of 
imperfect knowledge). 
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plaintiff, agreed with the notion that fees may not be appropriate where a 
party brought a suit to solely serve its own economic interests.149 
However, equally convincing is the counter argument that a party is 
entitled to fees and costs as long as its action contributed to the goals of the 
act, be it the CAA or CWA.150  Any additional incentives, however 
small,151 will likely help further promote the goals of the act and has even 
greater importance where an environmental friendly plaintiff lacks the 
resources to endure a protracted battle.  The possibility of recovering 
reasonable fees may make the difference between initiating a suit and 
waiting in the wings, hoping EPA will come to the rescue.  Furthermore, a 
competitor’s superior technical and competitive knowledge as well as 
financial motivation will more likely lead to successful actions, further 
enhancing enforcement of environmental regulations.152  While the statutes 
are silent in this regard, the legislative history appears to disfavor a blank-
check approach to fee shifting through its desire to “encourage litigation 
which will assure proper implementation and administration of the act or 
otherwise serve the public interest.”153 
A.  Developing a Solution 
Acknowledging the strength of each argument, this comment suggests 
two possible tests that can work to reconcile both views.  Overall, the test 
should not be convoluted and difficult to administer since courts typically 
rebuff complex tests, such as the original twelve-factor attorney fee test 
from Johnson.154  However, where a court must confront the economic 
value of environmental protection complexity will inevitably exist, as 
exemplified in Sierra Club v. Simkins Industries, where the court used a 
multipart test to help determine the actual amount of a civil penalty in a 
 
 149. Pound v. Airosol Co. (Pound II), 498 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 150. Florida II, 683 F.2d at 943; Pound II, 498 F.3d at 1102. 
 151. Miller, supra note 44, at 10,423 (“But of 300 recent fee award cases analyzed by the 
Department of Justice, rates awarded were above $75 an hour in only 20 percent of the cases. 
And in most of those cases there was a graduation in hourly rates awarded, with the highest 
rate seldom in excess of $100 an hour.”). 
 152. See Pound II, 498 F.3d at 1102; See also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n. 6 (1980) (where the Court in its famous 
opinion on commercial speech noted that “commercial speakers have extensive knowledge 
of both the market and their products. Thus, they are well situated to evaluate the accuracy of 
their messages and the lawfulness of the underlying activity.”). 
 153. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 337 (Comm. Rep.) (1977), as reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1416. 
 154. See Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-20; see supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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CWA enforcement action.155  That analysis required a complex evaluation 
of the “gravity of the violation, the financial status of the defendant, the 
possible deterrent effect of this assessment, and the past and present actions 
of the defendant.”156 
Before discussing solutions, one must confront the difficult task of 
defining economic and environmental benefit.  Luckily, for over twenty 
years these kinds of calculations have been a mainstay of environmental 
policy in the form of cost-benefit analysis (CBA), with the expectation that 
the costs of a regulation should not exceed its benefits.157  In fact, several 
environmental statutes, such as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),158 the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),159 
and the Safe Drinking Water Act,160 explicitly require such analysis.161 
B.  Measuring Economic Benefit 
Often such tests suffer from vagueness and difficulties of “producing 
prices for things that appear to be priceless,”162 especially when trying to 
determine the economic value of environmental protection.163  While 
difficult, this kind of valuation is neither impossible nor untried; in fact, 
much of the mechanisms already exist.  The requirement to measure 
economic benefit can be found in section 113 of the CAA, which requires 
courts to measure “economic benefit of noncompliance” and the “economic 
impact” of CAA penalties.164  Similar language exists in section 309 of the 
 
 155. Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 17 ENVTL. L. REP. (ELR) 20,346 (D. Md. 1986). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment, 115 ETHICS 351, 351 
(2005). 
 158. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2006). 
 159. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2006). 
 160. Safe Drinking Water Act; 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j-26 (2006). 
 161. Id.; DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 16 
(MIT Press 2003). 
 162. Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1558 (2002). 
 163. The court is no stranger to valuating such quantities. See John Stapleford, Wetlands 
Mitigation: Retroactive Application Of Clean Water Act Requirements To Property 
Destroyed By Natural Disasters, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. POL’Y REV. 861, 863 n.16 
(2007) (quoting EPA publication on valuating wetlands – “[f]or example, a value can be 
determined by the revenue generated from the sale of fish that depend on the wetland, by the 
tourist dollars associated with the wetland, or by public support for protecting fish and 
wildlife”). 
 164. Clean Air Act § 113(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (2006). 
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CWA involving the valuation of the “economic benefits (if any) resulting 
from [a] violation.”165 
Courts also have a great deal of experience determining economic 
impacts in environmental cases.  In Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,166 the court 
sought to balance the costs of regulation with a firm’s economic effect on a 
Minnesota town by evaluating the number of employees, tax payments, 
effects on the local economy, and similar indicia of impact.167  It would not 
require much imagination for a court to make similar calculations to 
determine the economic effects of a successful citizen challenge.  Because 
courts are generally viewed to have broad power when determining 
economic benefits in environmental enforcement actions, it would be 
reasonable to allow the court to have similar discretion when making such a 
decision in the context of the environmentally benefited plaintiff.168 
C.  Measuring Environmental Benefit 
Measuring environmental benefit suffers the most criticism since many 
find “certain values are simply incommensurable with money.”169  Other 
alternatives do exist, some of which rely on a hybrid method of combining 
a morally grounded goal of environmental protection with a relaxed cost-
benefit approach, which views the use of economic analysis as useful but 
not controlling.170  These methods, such as the contingent-valuation system, 
provide multiple ways to value environmental benefits, usually by 
determining the cost a consumer is willing to pay for an environmental 
improvement.171  Problems do arise where there is no measurable 
 
 165. Clean Water Act § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2006). 
 166. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). 
 167. Id. at 535-36 (“As of June 30, 1970 [Reserve] had 3,367 employees. During the 
calendar year 1969, its total payroll was approximately $31,700,000; and it expended the 
sum of $27,400,000 for the purchase of supplies and paid state and local taxes amounting to 
$4,250,000 . . .. Between four and six people are supported by each job in the mining 
industry, including those directly involved in the mining industry and those employed in 
directly and indirectly related fields.”) (quoting the state district court). 
 168. Pound v. Airosol, Co. (Pound II), 498 F.3d 1089, 1099 (10th Cir. 2007) (“the court 
has discretion in deciding how to calculate the economic benefits received from the 
defendant due to its noncompliance with the CAA”). 
 169. Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in 
Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1423-24 (2005). 
 170. Id. at 1434; DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 9 (University of Chicago Press, 
1999). 
 171. James L. Regens, Measuring Environmental Benefits with Contingent Valuation, 51 
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 345, 346 (1991) (describing a method to use survey techniques to 
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environmental impact.  Most experts, however, believe that current methods 
accurately gauge such benefits within some order of magnitude.172 
One of the best solutions has a long history within the Court’s 
Ruckelshaus test, which looks at an action as whether it has “substantially 
contributed to the goals of the Act”173 in order to determine whether 
attorney fees are appropriate.  A court can easily use this same calculus to 
value environmental outcomes of citizen actions by relying on multiple 
indices such as estimated reduction in air pollution, effects on biological 
diversity, and animal populations.174 
D.  Solution I – Balancing Test 
The first option is a simple balancing test that would weigh a 
plaintiff’s substantial economic benefit against the environmental benefit of 
the result.  If the plaintiff’s economic benefit outweighed the environmental 
benefit, the plaintiff would not be eligible for fees and costs.  To limit 
overuse, the test would only apply where substantial economic benefits 
existed against a measure of any level of environmental benefit.  Since any 
group pursuing a successful civil action under either 304 or 307 will 
potentially get some economic benefit,175 it would be reasonable to limit the 
test to cases involving substantial benefit, such as putting a competitor out 
of business, as described in Pound.176  Without this limitation, every time 
the court reaches the conclusion that a benefit has accrued, no matter how 
small, it would be required to apply the test.  This would be solely a 
 
determine public willingness to pay for environmental improvement to determine 
environmental value); see also Maureen Cropper, Has Economic Research Answered the 
Needs of Environmental Policy?, 39 J. OF ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 328 (2000). 
 172. William K. Stevens, Economists Strive to Find Environment’s Bottom Line, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 8, 1992, at C1; Andrew C. Revkin, Clinton Move on Pollution Wins Praise in 
the Northeast, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1997, at D26. 
 173. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 698-99 (1983). 
 174. Keith Keplinger, The Economics of Total Maximum Daily Loads, 43 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 1057, 1063 (2003). 
 175. See supra text accompanying note 146; See also Andrew J. Currie, Comment, The 
Use of Environmentally Beneficial Expenditures in Lieu of Penalties as Settlement of Citizen 
Lawsuits: A “Win-Win” Solution?, 1996 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U.L. REV. 652, 655 (1997) 
(describing environmentally beneficial expenditures (EBEs) used in lieu of penalty fines as 
“[a] payment made by a polluter in settlement of a citizen lawsuit. The payment is not made 
to the United States Treasury as would be the normal process for payment of a penalty fine, 
but rather a [payment] can be made to private organizations or to fund particular 
environmental projects, such as clean-ups or the creation of wetlands”). 
 176. Pound v. Airosol Co. (Pound I), 440 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1247 (D. Kan. 2006) (finding 
Pro Products’ “brought the instant lawsuit for the purpose of removing one of their 
competitors from the market”). 
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balancing test; once the economic benefit exceeded the environmental 
benefit the test would fail and no fee shifting would occur. 
E.  Solution II – Lodestar Test: Economic Benefit to Fee Cost Analysis. 
A second option is to use a more precise measure and compare the 
economic benefit177 with the court’s “reasonable” fee and cost computation, 
or the lodestar amount,178 to determine the appropriate benefit to cost ratio.  
If the economic benefit is larger, than fee shifting does not apply; 
otherwise, the court would reduce the lodestar by the actual economic 
benefit.  In this case, similar to Solution I, the threshold economic benefit 
must be substantial, which as explained above, would prevent overuse of 
the test in cases of borderline or negligible benefit.  Supporting a lodestar 
adjustment scheme, the Court in Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ 
Council for Clean Air proposed lodestar modification in certain rare and 
exceptional conditions.179  This approach is further supported by Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, which allowed modifications to the lodestar amount, suggesting 
that when “the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court 
should award only that amount that is reasonable in relation to the results 
obtained.” 180  The Court in Hensley further noted that “[a] reduced fee 
award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in 
comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.”181  While the Hensley 
case focused on the “partially prevailing party” debate, the principle of 
awarding partial costs for partial benefit does not exclude the subject of 
economic benefit from consideration.  Here the terms “limited success” and 
“limited relief” could be likened to the imbalance between economic and 
environmental benefit. 
 
 177. See supra Part V.A (using the same method to calculate economic benefit). 
 178. See supra Part III.B (relying on the method described in Pennsylvania v. Delaware 
Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air). 
 179. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 
(1986) (while mainly discussing the upward modification of the lodestar, there are no 
indications that the court would not be willing to accept reduced lodestar amounts to reflect 
economic benefit derived from litigation, in fact the court already has the tools to do this 
when calculating the lodestar prior to any modification as per Hensley – see supra note 97-
98 and accompanying text). 
 180. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983) (case involving attorney fee 
calculations stemming from application of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 
1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 where plaintiffs were only successful on one of a number of claims 
and awarded fees for the entire set of claims by a lower court). 
 181. Id. 
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 VI.  ANALYSIS 
While a conflict clearly exists as to what role economic benefit plays 
in a citizen suit under Sections 304 and 307 of the CAA, as well as any 
general judicial review under Section 307, the differences are far from 
extreme.  When the Ninth Circuit decided in Western States that “Congress 
neither intended to subsidize all litigation under the [CAA] nor 
contemplated that [section] 307(f) would benefit financially able parties 
who, out of their own substantial economic interests, would have litigated 
anyway,”182 they effectively applied the “appropriateness” test.  Finding 
that the petitioners failed the test, the court maintained that their litigation 
had not “served the public interest in assisting in the interpretation and 
implementation of the [CAA].”183  In essence, the court used economic 
benefit as an adjunctive test to the standard appropriateness test.  
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit in Pound also supported the notion that 
economic benefit may play a role where a plaintiff’s only motivation was 
economic.184 
Some may argue that additional tests taking into consideration 
economic benefit are duplicative of the “appropriate” test already used by 
the court to ensure the suit “contributed to the goals of the act.”185  
However, as seen in Western States, a court’s view of promoting or 
furthering the act does not always lead to environmentally friendly results.  
Therefore, a need exists to consider economic benefit beyond the “served 
the goals” test.186  The problem rests with the necessity for a court to have 
the additional tools to weigh the “appropriateness” of a suit more 
effectively.  Relying solely on a highly subjective reading of whether the 
result of an action “served the goals” of the CAA is bad public policy.  This 
policy issue comes into focus when the test of appropriateness appears to 
include a “proper implementation and administration” prong that might 
allow a court to ignore environmental policy over bureaucratic issues of 
efficacious implementation.187  The ultimate goal of using an economic 
 
 182. W. States Petroleum Ass’n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 286 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Pound v. Airosol Co. (Pound II), 498 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007); see supra 
text accompanying notes 134, 149 and accompanying text. 
 185. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983). 
 186. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 187. See Florida II, 683 F.2d at 942 (the court “stated their [prior] decision would help 
maintain ‘the balance of state and federal responsibilities that undergird the efficacy of the 
Clean Air Act . . .’” (quoting Fla. Power & Light, Co. v. Costle, 650 F.2d 579, 589 (5th Cir. 
Unit B June 1981))) (emphasis added); see also Pound II, 498 F.3d at 1101. 
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benefits test is to prevent abuse of the various fee shifting provisions by 
those parties whose sole objective centers on self-enrichment with no 
thought of environmental benefit. 
Beyond the environmental concerns lies a simple economic truth, if a 
citizen faces off against either the EPA or a large corporation, he is 
generally at a distinct disadvantage.188 The citizen or public interest firm 
typically has fewer financial189 and personnel190 resources and rarely has an 
economic incentive to sue.191  Thus, fee shifting acts as a useful device to 
“level the playing field” by making up for the lesser resources of the 
plaintiff.192  When the mechanism of fee shifting applies to parties who 
have an economic motivation, it disrupts the economic equilibrium, 
resulting in a plaintiff getting double benefit and inherently leading to an 
economically inefficient outcome.193 
Solution II, where a court weighs a plaintiff’s significant economic 
benefit against its lodestar, has the benefit of taking economic benefit into 
consideration, while avoiding the pitfalls of determining environmental 
benefit.  This test would be the easiest to administer once a court 
determines the level of economic benefit.  As soon as a substantial 
economic benefit was established, the lodestar would not be difficult to 
determine.194  Then, by relying on simple math, the court could effectively 
“prorate” the lodestar based on the economic benefit, without ever having to 
delve into the thorny issue of valuing the environmental benefit of the 
action.  The need to determine environmental benefit would not vanish 
 
 188. Michael D. Axline, The Limits of Statutory Law and the Wisdom of Common Law, 38 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,268, 10,274 (2008) (noting the need for fee-shifting 
provisions because “[w]ithout them citizens simply could not afford to prosecute 
environmental cases”). 
 189. See Kimberly McKelvey, Comment, Public Interest Lawyering in the United States 
and Montana: Past, Present and Future, 67 MONT. L. REV. 337, 351 (2006) (“Many public 
interest law firms do not have the resources to litigate every case, and focus instead on other 
avenues to resolve cases.”). 
 190. Id. at 339 (“Public interest law firms . . . remain essential . . . [however only] 70% of 
entering law students aspire to practice public interest law upon graduation [and] only 5% 
actually enter the field.”). 
 191. See infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 192. Chad Settle, Terrance M. Hurley & Jason F. Shogren, Citizen Suits, in THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 230-31 (Anthony Heyes ed. 2001). 
 193. Id. at 245 (commenting that “asymmetric reimbursement rules can decrease 
efficiency if they induce players to fight harder than they otherwise would” – there is no 
doubt that by giving a plaintiff the double advantage of both attorneys’ fees and a significant 
economic benefit, the plaintiff would fight harder than if they only would get one of the two 
benefits). 
 194. See supra Part III.B. 
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since the entire initial measure of appropriateness rests on whether a 
plaintiff had “served the goals” of the act.195 
 VII.  CONCLUSION 
These suggested tests act to put potential challengers on notice.  By 
forcing parties to consider the costs of litigation before acting, one can limit 
both the judicial inefficiency of poorly reasoned actions and reduce the 
likelihood of bad environmental decision-making.  Furthermore, in cases in 
which industry challenges limitations or acts of the administrator under 
section 307, as they did in both Western States and Florida Power & Light 
Co., the economic benefit test would constrain industry by reducing further 
inducement in the form of reimbursed attorneys’ fees and costs without 
resorting to the evaluation of financial solvency or pro-environmental 
predisposition.  In contrast, environmental groups who might obtain a 
tangential economic benefit196 would find protection from undue scrutiny 
since the test is limited to a substantial economic benefit. 
Furthermore, balancing environmental impact and economic benefit is 
an established desire of the judicial system in environmental cases.  In 
Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, the court explicitly noted that “in fashioning 
relief in a case such as this involving a possibility of future harm, a court 
should strike a proper balance between the benefits conferred and the 
hazards created by [the defendant’s] facility.”197  History and precedent 
demonstrate the court’s ability and desire to balance economic and 
environmental benefit in a host of situations, from regulatory to 
enforcement actions.198  Moreover, the current circuit court split illustrates 
a need to develop a coherent and consistent test in the case of an 
economically benefited plaintiff, which would be satisfied by any of the 
above-suggested solutions.  Failing an explicit analysis as laid out above, at 
a minimum, a court should consider a plaintiff’s economic benefit in 
determining the “appropriateness” of fees in order to mitigate both the 
economic inefficiency and environmental harm that a “blank check” 
approach would encourage. 
 
 
 195. Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 196. Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 27, at 839-40 (arguing that besides attorneys’ fees a 
citizen litigator’s incentives might include settling so as to obtain “an ‘environmental fund’ 
dedicated to particular conservation uses . . . [and] . . . bring suits for the purpose of 
attracting or retaining members”); see Currie, supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 197. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 535 (8th Cir. 1975). 
 198. See supra notes 156, 158-160, 166 and accompanying text. 
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